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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

LOSING IN THE TAX SYSTEM AFTER YOU WIN IN THE COURT
SYSTEM: SHOULD CONTINGENT FEES PAID TO THE ATTORNEY
BE INCLUDED IN THE TAXPAYER-CLIENT’S GROSS INCOME?

I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the Courts of Appeal of many circuits have been faced
with the question of whether contingent fees paid to attorneys must be included
in the taxpayer-client’s gross income. This issue arises when a taxpayer-client
enters into an agreement with an attorney to pay him or her a contingent fee.1
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) contends that the taxpayer-client should
include the contingent fee in their gross income but the IRS will allow a
deduction for the contingent fee amount.2 In contrast, the taxpayer-client
wants to exclude the contingent fee from their gross income. By excluding the
contingent fee from their gross income the taxpayer-client would have a lower
tax bill then would be achieved by the deduction allowed by the IRS. The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated the problem well, “contingent fee
contracts defy easy categorization, standing as they do somewhere in between
two poles – on the one hand, an obvious scheme to evade taxation through
diversion of future income streams to another, and on the other hand, full and
complete divestment of an income source.”3
In 1959 Cotnam v. Commissioner first addressed this issue.4 In Cotnam,
Ms. Cotnam previously received a judgment in the amount of $125,620 and
had attorney’s fees in the amount of $50,365.83.5 The court found that under
Alabama law6 Ms. Cotnam could never receive the attorney’s fees herself
because of a lien that was superior to all liens that the attorney had on the
judgment proceeds.7 This lien had to be paid before Ms. Cotnam receive any

1. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “contingent fee” as, “A fee charged for a lawyer’s
services only if the lawsuit is successful or is favorably settled out of court. Contingent Fees are
usually calculated as a percentage of the client’s net recovery.” Black’s Law Dictionary 315 (7th
ed. 1999).
2. Kenseth v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 399, 405-06 (2000) (provides a summary of the
IRS’s position).
3. Srivastava v. Commissioner, 220 F.3d 353, 360 (5th Cir. 2000).
4. 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959).
5. Id. at 121; see infra Part II(A).
6. 46 ALA. CODE § 64(2) (1940).
7. Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125.
477
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of the judgement proceeds.8 The court held that the contingent fees should not
be included in Ms. Cotnam’s gross income because she never had a right to
receive any of those fees because of the existence of the lien.9 From this
beginning several other Circuits have ruled on this issue, some finding that the
contingent fees are included in the gross income of the taxpayer-client10 and
some finding that the fees are not included in the taxpayer-client’s gross
income.11
Those circuits holding that the fees are included in the taxpayer-client’s
gross income generally rest their holdings on three major arguments: (1) the
assignment of income doctrine;12 (2) the taxpayer-client received the economic
benefit of the money;13 or (3) the “in lieu of” test from Raytheon Products
Corp. v. Commissioner.14 In contrast, the arguments used by circuits holding
that the fees should not be included in the taxpayer-client’s gross income are:
(1) the attorney and the taxpayer-client entered into a joint venture when they
entered into the contingent fee agreement;15 (2) the attorney and the taxpayerclient are joint owners in property;16 or (3) the precedent of Cotnam.17
The IRS’s position of allowing the contingent fees to be deducted rather
than of allowing the fees to be excluded from gross income leaves the
taxpayer-client in worse position then if they were allowed to exclude the fees
from their income. The reason for this is that by excluding the fees the
taxpayer-client would have an overall lower tax bill than if they deducted the
fees.18 There is one group of cases in which this issue is not germane. In
personal injury cases all proceeds received on account of personal physical
injuries or sickness are excluded from gross income.19
Part II of this article will discuss Cotnam to help understand the origins
and history of the issue. Part III will examine the cases holding that the

8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Alexander v. IRS, 72 F.3d 938 (1st Cir. 1995); Coady v. Commissioner, 231 F.3d 1187
(9th Cir. 2000); Benci-Woodward v. Commissioner, 219 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2000); Baylin v.
United States, 43 F.3d 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
11. Cotnam, 263 F.2d 119; Srivastava, 220 F.3d 352; Estate of Clarks v. United States, 202
F.3d 854, 856 (6th Cir. 2000); Davis v. Commissioner, 210 F.3d 1346, 1347 (11th Cir. 2000).
12. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114 (1930); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 114 (1940).
13. Baylin, 43 F.3d at 1454-55; Alexander, 72 F.3d at 942-43; Coady, 231 F.3d at 1191.
14. Alexander, 72 F.3d at 942-43; Coady, 231 F.3d at 1190-91. See Raytheon Products
Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110, 113 (1st Cir. 1944).
15. Clarks, 202 F.3d at 857.
16. Id.
17. Cotnam, 263 F.2d 119.
18. An exclusion is a guaranteed reduction in the taxpayer’s tax liability whereas a deduction
is not.
19. IRC § 104(a)(2); Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (IRC § 104(a)(2) applies to funds received through
the prosecution or settlement of “tort or tort type rights”).
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contingent fees are included in the taxpayer-client’s gross income. Part IV
evaluates and addresses cases finding contingent fees should not be included in
the taxpayer-client’s gross income. In Parts III and IV both the winning and
losing arguments will be examined and traced back to their origins in earlier
court opinions. Finally, Part V will consider and examine what the correct
analysis of the issue should be and what the future of the issue might be.
II. HISTORY AND HOLDING OF COTNAM V. COMMISSIONER
A.

Facts

In 1940, Ethel Cotnam entered into an oral arrangement to act as an
attendant to T. Shannon Hunter for the rest of his life and in return for this
service Mr. Hunter was to give Ms. Cotnam one-fifth of his estate.20 Mr.
Hunter died intestate four and one-half years later.21 Ms. Cotnam filed suit to
receive her payment and after a long lawsuit she was awarded $125,620.22
Before filing suit Ms. Cotnam entered into a contingent fee arrangement with
the law firm of Johnston, McCall & Johnston, of Mobile, Alabama.23
The Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service (“Commissioner”)
concluded that the entire judgment should properly be included in Ms.
Cotnam’s gross income.24 The Commissioner assessed a deficiency of
approximately $36,985.25 Ms. Cotnam challenged the deficiency.26 The Tax
Court found in favor of the Commissioner.27 That decision was appealed to
the Fifth Circuit.28

20. Id. at 120.
21. Id.
22. Cotnam v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 947, 950 (1957) (The judgment was for $125,620
which included interest of $5,620). See Merchants National Bank v. Cotnam, 24 So.2d 122 (Ala.
1948) (this is Ms. Cotnam’s original case to receive payment for her services).
23. Cotnam, 28 T.C. at 948; Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125. Attorney’s fees for Ms. Cotnam’s
case amounted to approximately $50,365, which left approximately $75,254 remaining for Ms.
Cotnam. The IRS did not include the interest in the calculations and the Commissioner prorated
Ms. Cotnam’s award over the four and one-half years that she worked for Mr. Hunter in
accordance with IRC § 107 (1939).
24. Cotnam, 28 T.C. at 950 (The IRS did not include the interest in the calculations). The
Commissioner prorated Ms. Cotnam’s award over the four and one-half years that she worked for
Mr. Hunter in accordance with IRC § 107 (1939).
25. Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 121.
26. Cotnam, 28 T.C. at 948.
27. Id. at 954.
28. Cotnam, 263 F.2d 119.
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Arguments Presented

The Commissioner’s argument was based on the U.S. Supreme Court case
of Lucas v. Earl.29 In Earl, the Supreme Court held that even if a taxpayer
assigns or contracts away some of his or her earnings or right to income before
it is received, those earnings are still included in the taxpayer’s gross income.30
This rule has been referred to as the assignment of income doctrine.31 The Tax
Court found for the Commissioner but did not rest its holding on the
Commissioner’s argument. The fax Court instead held that the contingent fees
paid to Ms. Cotnam’s attorneys should be included in her gross income
because Ms. Cotnam owned the original claim and she was the party who
received the final award and had full right and title to it.32
The Fifth Circuit on appeal also addressed the issue of whether Ms.
Cotnam received the economic benefit of the money even though it was paid
directly to the attorney.33 The court noted that based on Helvering v. Horst any
economic benefit Ms. Cotnam received from the contingent fee portion of the
award should be included in her gross income.34 The Fifth Circuit though in
Cotnam did not follow Horst and held that the fees paid to the attorney should
not be included in Ms. Cotnam’s gross income.35
Ms. Cotnam argued that she never received money paid to the attorneys
and as such she never had a right to it.36 Her primary argument was that under
Alabama law attorneys have a lien that is superior to all liens against the
judgment.37 Under this Alabama law the judgment cannot be paid to the
taxpayer-client until the attorney is paid his or her fees.38 The Fifth Circuit
read the Alabama attorney lien statute as saying Ms. Cotnam never realized as

29. Id. at 125; Cotnam, 28 T.C. at 953-54. See Lucas v. Earl, 218 U.S. 111 (1930).
30. Id. at 113-14 (Earl contracted with his wife that she should receive one-half of his
earnings, the Court held that despite this contract and the amount of earnings being uncertain the
earnings are still apart of Earl’s gross income).
31. See Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125.
32. Cotnam, 28 T.C. at 954.
33. Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 126. See supra Part II(C) for explanation of the economic benefit
Ms. Cotnam received.
The Supreme Court in Helvering v. Horst held that when a taxpayer receives the
economic benefit of some income or the right to receive some income the but assigns away the
right to receive the income the assignment of income doctrine applies and the income is included
in their gross income regardless if they have not received it yet. 311 U.S. 112, 119-20 (1940)
(Mr. Horst gave interest coupons from a bond to his son, the Court held that since Mr. Horst had
earned the right to the payment of the coupons, he should be taxed on them despite the fact that
the money was being paid to his son).
34. 311 U.S. at 120.
35. Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125-26.
36. Cotnam, 28 T.C. at 951.
37. Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125; see 46 ALA. CODE § 64 (1940).
38. Id.
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income the portion of the judgment paid to the attorney because she never had
a right to receive it and thus should not be taxed on it.39
C. Holding
On appeal the Fifth Circuit agreed with Ms. Cotnam and held that the
contingent fees should not be included in her gross income.40 The court relied
heavily upon the Alabama statue and how it had been construed in earlier
cases.41 One of these cases is an earlier Fifth Circuit case, United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Levy, which stated that the Alabama statute created
an equitable lien in favor of the attorney that gives the attorney a right to the
judgment before the plaintiff.42 It is this point from Alabama law that the court
primarily used to rest their holding.43
Judges Rives and Brown, in addition to the majority’s reasoning, added
that the contingent fees should not be included Ms. Cotnam’s gross income
since she never had any actual control over the money retained by the
attorneys.44 They state that, “[t]he only income, the only real economic
benefit, which Ms. Cotnam ever received was the [amount] she collected . . . In
a realistic sense the remaining [amount] was income of the attorneys, not Ms.
Cotnam.”45
Judges Rives and Brown held that the assignment of income doctrine under
Earl and Horst did not apply because Ms. Cotnam was never in a position to
realize the income without the aid of her attorneys.46 The attorney’s
knowledge and expertise was needed to turn Ms. Cotnam’s claim into any type
of award. In contrast, in both Earl and Horst, the taxpayers had a preexisting
right to the income and had earned it before they assigned it to a third party.47
The Earl case bears many factual similarities with the Supreme Court case
of Poe v. Seaborn, but they can be easily distinguished.48 In Seaborn the Court
dealt with the issue of community property and determined that under the laws
of Washington State all property owned by husband or wife is community
property of the marriage and for tax purposes each spouse can claim half of all

39. Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 126.
40. Id. at 125-26.
41. Id.
42. 77 F.2d 972, 975 (5th Cir. 1935). The court held that the Alabama statue gives the
attorney the same rights and powers over the judgment or settlement that their clients have.
43. Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125-26.
44. Id. at 126. The addition of Judge Rives and Brown is included in the body of the
majority opinion, but is setoff by a separate header.
45. Id.
46. Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125-26.
47. See Earl, 281 U.S. at 113; Horst, 311 U.S. at 117.
48. 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
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the income and half of all the expenses for their individual tax returns.49 The
Court in Seaborn distinguished Earl because in Earl the court held that by law
the earnings at issue were the husband’s property and his own individual
income and in Seaborn the earnings were by law not the husband’s property or
individual income but were community property.50 The community property
issue from Seaborn will not influence the determination of whether contingent
fees should be included in gross income. This is because whether or not
contingent fees are included in gross income is an issue of the contents of gross
income and community property issue from Seaborn is one of allocation of
gross income between husband and wife.
III. CASES HOLDING THAT CONTINGENT FEES ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE
CLIENT’S GROSS INCOME
Following the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Cotnam, the Sixth and Eleventh
circuits have also held that contingent fees are not included in gross income.51
Along with following Cotnam, the other circuits have developed other lines of
reasoning to support the exclusion of contingent fees from the taxpayer-client’s
gross income.52 The most prominent of these alternative lines of reasoning is
in the Sixth Circuit case of Estate of Clarks v. United States.53 There the court
held that the taxpayer-client and the attorney entered into a joint venture with
regard to the taxpayer-client’s claim and are, thus, joint owners of the claim.54
In many ways, this new argument is not different from the attorney lien theory
from Cotnam, and indeed is merely a logical extension of it. The reason for
this similarity is that both of the theories treat the client and attorney as
working together in the lawsuit towards a common goal.55 Also, in Alexander
v. IRS, the taxpayer-client sets out an additional argument, which the court
rejected, that the legal fee is an expenditure that should be charged to the
capital account and should be offset by settlement proceeds to determine the

49. Id. at 113. The Court was construing sections 210(a) and 211(a) of the Revenue Act of
1926. 83 Stat. 9, 21-22 (1927). The Court notes that other states have similar community
property laws as Washington. 282 U.S. at 115.
50. Id. at 117. The two cases were applying different laws. In Earl the Court was applying
the Revenue Act of 1918 and in Seaborn the Court was applying the Revenue Act of 1926. See
supra note 147 and infra note 49.
51. Estate of Clarks v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 856 (6th Cir. 2000); Davis v.
Commissioner, 210 F.3d 1346, 1347 (11th Cir. 2000); Srivastava v. Commissioner, 220 F.3d 353,
355 (5th Cir. 2000).
52. See Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 857 (the value of the award was entirely speculative
and had to be earned and attorney and client entered into a join-venture of sorts).
53. Id.
54. See id.
55. The similarities between these two theories will be discussed further in Part III(C).
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gain.56 The net effect of this argument would be to exclude the fees paid to the
attorney from the taxpayer-client’s gross income.
To find for the taxpayer-client, the courts must find ways to avoid the
application of the assignment of income doctrine from Earl and Horst. There
are three primary ways that courts have found to avoid the application of the
doctrine. They all rest upon a narrow reading of both the Earl and the Horst
cases.
A. Avoidance of the Assignment of Income Doctrine
Before explaining the arguments used to exclude contingent fees from the
taxpayer-client’s gross income and how they fit in with the holding in Cotnam,
it seems necessary to explain how the courts avoid the application of the
assignment of income doctrine from Earl and Horst. Simply put, the courts
have characterized the contingent fee arrangements as an exception to the
doctrine. There have been three primary methods used to skirt the doctrine.
The first method used is to argue that the taxpayer has not received any
economic benefit. In both Earl and Horst the Court held that the taxpayer
received the economic benefit of the income despite having transferred the
income to a third party, but in some of the cases that do not apply the doctrine
the courts hold that the taxpayer-client never received any economic benefit of
the income.57 The second method to avoid the doctrine focuses upon the lack
of control that the taxpayer-client has over the claim.58 The third method is a
factual distinction that in contingent fee cases the attorney must earn his or her
part of the judgment award.59
The Supreme Court in both Earl and Horst hold out that the taxpayer had
received the economic benefit of the income assigned.60 It is a long-standing
rule that regardless if the taxpayer receives actual payment of income earned,
realization of the income, for tax purposes, can occur when the taxpayer has
enjoyed the economic benefit of the income.61 In cases of assigning the
income before it is received, the Supreme Court states in Horst that the “power
to procure the payment of income to another is the enjoyment [or economic

56. 72 F.3d 941-42.
57. See Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 857.
58. Earl, 281 U.S. at 114; Horst, 311 U.S. at 120; see Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 359-60.
59. See id. at 360-61; Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 858.
60. See Earl, 281 U.S. at 114; Horst, 311 U.S. at 120 (the taxpayer had enjoyed the fruits or
economic benefit of their labor).
61. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716, 729 (1929). The taxpayer
enjoyed the economic benefit of the money paid by his employer to the Government to pay off
his tax bill, thus the amount paid by the company is income to the taxpayer. See Srivastava, 220
F.3d at 359. The court agrees what is taxed is not receipt of funds, but instead the economic
benefit of the funds whether that be through actual receipt of the funds or some other method.
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benefit], and hence the realization, of the income by him who exercises [the
power].”62
Cotnam and the Sixth Circuit case of Estate of Clarks do not disagree with
the principle that the enjoyment of the economic benefit of the right to receive
some income is realization of that income.63 But Cotnam and Estate of Clarks
hold that, unlike in Earl and Horst, the taxpayer-clients did not have an
absolute right to any income that could be assigned and absent any absolute
right to the income there can be no enjoyment of any economic benefit from
it.64 In sum, the basic reason for the holding in Estate of Clarks is that there
was no absolute right to any income before the final judgment in the initial
case.65 As the court in Estate of Clarks stated, “[h]ere [in this case] there was
no res, no fund, no proceeds, no vested interest, only a hope to receive money
from the lawyer’s efforts and the client’s right, a right yet to be determined by
judge and jury.”66 Based on this absence of an absolute right to receive any
earned income, the court held that the assignment of income doctrine does not
apply.67
The second method to avoid the assignment of income doctrine focuses
upon the lack of control that the taxpayer-client has over his or her claim once
they have entered into a contingent fee arrangement with an attorney. In
Horst, the Supreme Court held that so long as the person who earns the income
retains control over the income it is taxable to them even if the income is paid
to a third party.68 The court in Srivastava did not hold that Dr. Sudir
Srivastava had divested complete control over his entire claim to avoid being
taxed on the income, but they did state that Dr. Srivastava did divest control of
a portion of his claim.69 The result of this part divesture of control left the
court in a “quandary” and could not apply the assignment of income doctrine
solely based on factors of control over the future income.70 The Srivastava
court did not make it clear if there was a critical amount of control that if
62. Horst, 311 U.S. at 118. The result in Horst might have been different had Horst given
the bond to his son and not just the interest coupons because Horst would have been divesting the
source of the income and not just the income.
63. Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 126.
64. Id. at 126 (she [Ms. Cotnam] could never have . . . enjoyed any economic benefit unless
she had employed the attorneys); Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 857.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 857-60.
68. Horst, 311 U.S. at 119. See also Commissioner v. First Sec. Bank, 405 U.S. 394, 403
(1972) (holding that in order to be taxed for income, the taxpayer must have complete dominion
over it).
69. Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 360.
70. Id. (“control over that claim . . . is neither fully divested to the attorney nor fully retained
by the taxpayer-client. . . . The control test thus leaves us [the court] in a quandary. In light of
this ambiguity, a number of other factors might be considered.”).
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divested would avoid the application of the assignment of income doctrine or if
any divesture would achieve this result.
The final method of skirting the application of the assignment of income
doctrine is a factual dissimilarity between Earl and Horst and the contingent
fee cases. In both Earl and Horst the third party receiving the income
performed no services for the taxpayer transferring the income – they were
gratuitous transfers.71 In contrast, both Estate of Clarks and Srivastava notes
that the assignment of income doctrine should not apply since the attorney did
not receive a gratuitous transfer from the taxpayer-client, but rather had to use
his or her own skills and knowledge to receive the income.72
It thus appears that the primary way that courts have been able to avoid the
usage of the assignment of income doctrine is by distinguishing Earl and Horst
factually.73 This allows courts with different factual situations to easily avoid
applying the doctrine.
B.

Cotnam v. Commissioner as Precedent

Two circuits, the Fifth and the Eleventh, are bound, as a result of the split
of the Fifth Circuit, 74 by the holding in Cotnam and other circuits have looked
to the reasoning found in Cotnam.75 In the Sixth Circuit case of Estate of
Clarks, the court was not bound to the holding in Cotnam but still examined
the reasoning from Cotnam.76 In following Cotnam, the Srivastava court noted
some reservations about doing so.77 These reservations stem from a
disagreement with the application of the assignment of income doctrine and the
fact that Cotnam was decided under Alabama law.78

71. Earl, 281 U.S. at 113-14 (the taxpayer transferred the income to his wife solely to avoid
taxation); Horst, 311 U.S. at 114 (taxpayer gave the income as a gift to his son). See also Jones
v. Commissioner, 306 F.2d 292, 302 (5th Cir. 1962) (“No gratuity or gift is involved here as has
been involved in numerous other cases [Earl and Horst].”).
72. Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 360-61; Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 857 (“The assignee [in Earl
and Horst] performed no services in order to receive the income . . . Here there was . . . only a
hope to receive money from the lawyer’s efforts”).
73. The facts in Earl and Horst are significant because in both of them there was already a
definite right to receive income and there was still some control over the right to receive the
income or there was economic benefit received by the taxpayer for the transfer of the right to
receive the income.
74. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (the
Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the Fifth Circuit handed down
prior to the close of business on September, 30 1981).
75. Davis, 210 F.3d at 1348 (“Because we [the court] find that Cotnam v. Commissioner is
controlling . . . we affirm the decision of the Tax Court.”).
76. Clarks, 202 F.3d 856.
77. Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 363.
78. Id. at 361-63 (the court was applying Texas law).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

486

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:477

The Srivastava court appears to believe that the assignment of income
doctrine should apply because the taxpayer-client has, in their view, received
the economic benefit of the income paid to the attorney.79 The court declared
this view, “[w]ere we ruling on a tabula rasa,80 we might be inclined to
include contingent fees in gross income.”81 The Srivastava court did not find it
persuasive that the value of the claim is uncertain and thus the assignment of
income doctrine should not apply.82 The court in Srivastava seems to be
saying that the money paid under the contingent fee agreement should be
treated the same as money paid out of pocket to an attorney for services and to
reach this goal the court cites to the assignment of income doctrine.83 In the
end, despite its reservations, the Srivastava court held that the contingent fees
are not included in the taxpayer-client’s gross income.84 The court states that
Cotnam is too factually similar to their case and as a result must be followed.85
The dissent argues that the contingent fees should be included in gross income
because Cotnam dealt with an Alabama law that setup a unique superior lien
for the attorney against the taxpayer-client’s award and under Texas law the
attorneys are not granted the same right.86 The Alabama attorney lien statute
will be examined and addressed in Part III(C).
In Foster v. United States, a district court case applying Alabama law, the
district court followed the precedent of Cotnam but noted some limitations on
the holding of Cotnam.87 The court limited Cotnam by holding that it only
applies to contingent fee agreements entered into prior to the final judgment.88
The Foster court held, based on the precedent of Cotnam, that the part of
Mattie Foster’s award paid to the attorney under the contingent fee agreement
(entered into prior to the judgment) was not included in her gross income.89
Mattie Foster entered into a second contingent fee agreement with the attorney
after the judgment regarding the provision of appellate services.90 The court,
however, distinguished Cotnam and held that the fees paid under the second
79. Id.
80. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “tabula rasa” as, “A blank tablet ready for writing; a
clean slate.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1465 (7th ed. 1999).
81. Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 357.
82. Id. at 361-63.
83. Id. at 363 (“[h]e [the taxpayer-client] should not receive preferential tax treatment from
the simple fortuity that he hired counsel on a contingent basis”).
84. Id. at 357-58. See supra Part III(C)(1) for additional grounds for holding that contingent
fees should not be included in the taxpayer-client’s gross income used by the Srivastava court.
85. Id. (“Because Cotnam is substantially indistinguishable from this case, we reverse the
Tax Court and decide that contingent fees governed by Texas law are also excludable.”).
86. Id. at 367-68.
87. 106 F. Supp.2d 1234, 1239 (N.D. Ala. 2000).
88. Id. at 1237-38.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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contingent fee agreement were not excluded from the taxpayer-client’s gross
income because the contingent fee was entered into post-judgment.91 The
court stated that the assignment of income doctrine92 would apply because the
income had been earned and the value of it was no longer uncertain.93
The Foster court in dicta reasoned that, in its view, Cotnam should be
reconsidered based on a misinterpretation of the Alabama law involving
contingent fee agreements and attorney lien rights to the judgment.94 The
misinterpretation of the Alabama law is based on the high level of actual
control that a taxpayer-client retains over the litigation after the parties have
agreed to the contingent fee agreement.95
C. Joint-Ownership Theory
Some of the cases have held that contingent fees are not included in the
gross income of the taxpayer-client have relied on the joint-ownership theory.96
This theory is similar to the lien theory used in Cotnam.97 This section will
examine the joint-ownership theory and its similarity to the attorney-lien
theory used in Cotnam.
1. Summary of the Joint Ownership Theory
In order to best explain and summarize this theory the familiar analogy,
from Earl,98 of the taxpayer owning an orchard and how both the trees and
fruit are distributed to others will be used.99 In this analogy there is an
important difference between the fruit and the trees. The fruit represents the
actual monetary award that the taxpayer-client is receiving and all the trees
represent the entire claim that is being litigated.
The joint-ownership theory contends that when the contingent fee
agreement is signed it transfers to the attorney some of the taxpayer-client’s

91. Id. (“Cotnam did not involve, and should not control, the taxability of attorneys’ fees
under an assignment made after a chose-in-action had been transformed through a jury trial into a
money judgment, a part of which (including post-judgment interest) would constitute gross
income if and when received.”).
92. See infra Part III(A) for a discussion of the assignment of income doctrine.
93. Foster, 106 F. Supp.2d at 1238-39.
94. Id. at 1239.
95. Id. Particularly the court points to the taxpayer-client’s power to discharge the attorney
at any time during the litigation.
96. Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 857-58; Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 360.
97. Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125.
98. 281 U.S. at 114-15.
99. In the use of this analogy there is an important difference between the fruit and the trees.
The fruit represents the actual monetary award that the taxpayer-client is receiving and all the
trees represent the entire claim that is being litigated.
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trees and they become tenants-in-common100 of the orchard.101 As a result of
being tenants-in-common the attorney must assist the orchard owner (the
taxpayer-client) in cultivating and caring for the all trees if they hope to receive
any fruit.102 In contrast, the IRS argues that the taxpayer-client only transfers
the fruit of the orchard to the attorney at the end of the case (i.e. just pays
them).103 The result of the joint-ownership theory is that the each party will
receive the fruit from their own trees that they owned and cultivated. If this is
the case, then the income should be included to the gross income of the one
who earned it.104 The result of this it to have the taxpayer-client include in
their gross income the income from the portion of the claim that they own and
have the attorney include in their gross income the portion that they own.
Based on the joint-ownership theory the court in Srivastava held that “[t]he
income should be charged to the one who earned it and received it . . . [not] to
the one who neither received it nor earned it.”105 In a contingent fee situation
under the joint-ownership theory the attorney would pay taxes on the part of
the award they receive as fees and the taxpayer-client would pay taxes on the
part of the award they receive.
2. Similarity of Joint-Ownership Theory with the Cotnam Lien Argument
An issue that many courts, including the Tax Court, have had is that
statutes in other states do not give the attorney in a contingent fee arrangement
the same type of superior lien as is given under Alabama law.106 Because other
states’ statutes are not like Alabama’s,107 non-Alabama courts, must find other
ways of justifying their holdings besides state attorney lien laws. The best
example of how this is done is the courts giving attorneys the same rights as
the taxpayer-client to the award by following the joint-ownership theory.

100. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “tenancy in common” as, “A tenancy by two or more
persons, in equal or unequal undivided shares, each person having an equal right to possess the
whole property but not right of survivorship.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1478 (7th ed. 1999).
101. Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 857-58; Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 360.
102. Id.
103. Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 858.
104. Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 856.
105. 220 F.3d at 361.
106. See Coady, 213 F.3d 1190 (Alaska law does not give an attorney a superior lien or
ownership interest like Alabama law does); Baylin, 43 F.3d at 1154 (Maryland law); BenciWoodward, 219 F.3d at 941 (California law); Estate of Gadlow v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 975,
980 (1968) (Pennsylvania law); Petersen v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 137, 152 (1962) (Nebraska
and South Dakota law); Sinyard v. Commissioner, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 654, 658 (1998) (Arizona
law); Hukkanen-Campbell v. Commissioner, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 2122, 2126 (2000) (Missouri
Law).
107. See Hukkanen-Campbell, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 2122, 2126 (“the Missouri provision [and
others], unlike the Alabama provision, does not give attorneys the same right and power over
suits, judgments, and decrees as their clients had or may have.”).
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If the joint-ownership theory and the Alabama statute are examined sideby-side, they appear to create the same situation between the taxpayer-client
and the attorney. Under the Alabama statute, the attorney is given a lien on the
recovery that is superior to all other liens and must be paid before the taxpayerclient can receive any of the judgment.108 The pertinent section of the
Alabama statute states:
Upon suits, judgments, and decrees for money, they [the attorneys] shall have
a lien superior to all liens but tax liens, and no person shall be at liberty to
satisfy said suit, judgment or decree, until the lien or claim of the attorney for
his [or her] fees [are] fully satisfied109

The situation that the Alabama statue creates is similar to the way a joint
owner cannot take profits from the property without giving the other joint
owners their share of the profits. The arrangement of assignment of income in
a joint-ownership of property situation is described as, “income [from joint
ownership of property] . . . belong[s] in fact and in law to the individuals . . . in
the proportions fixed in and by their instruments and dealings.”110
In a joint-ownership situation each of the owners has a right to a share of
the profits generated by the property in accordance with the agreement entered
into by the parties. In contingent fee cases the agreement setting the method
and amount of the “profit” distribution is the contingent fee contract entered
into by the attorney and taxpayer-client. Under the Alabama statue the same
situation occurs – the parties are legally entitled to their respective portions of
the judgment award.111
It appears that the courts that made the analogy between the contingent fee
agreements and a situation of joint-ownership reached the same conclusion that
was reached in Cotnam by means of the Alabama attorney lien statute.112 In
Cotnam the court held that the Alabama statue gave attorneys an equitable

108. 46 ALA. CODE § 64 (1940). The code section has not changed since 1940. See ALA.
CODE §31-3-61 (1975).
109. Id.
110. Scofield v. Mauritz, 206 F.2d 135, 140-41 (5th Cir. 1953) (concerning the allocation of
income of a partnership to its partners for tax purposes). See also West v. Commissioner, 214
F.2d 300, 303 (5th Cir. 1954) (the court makes the same statement about the distribution of
income in a joint-ownership arrangement). It is worth noting that both of these courts held that it
was a misapplication of the law for the IRS to attribute all the income of a joint-ownership to only
one of the owners.
111. 46 ALA. CODE § 64(1) (1940); ALA. CODE § 34-3-61 (1975).
112. A possible problem with the joint-ownership theory is that it could require the attorney
to acquire a proprietary interest in the litigation. This can violate Rule 1.8(j) of the Rule of
professional conduct that forbid an attorney from acquiring a proprietary interest in the litigation
the attorney is conducting. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(j) (1983); see
also Missouri Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel, Informal Op. 20000238 (2000), summary
reprinted in THE MISSOURI BAR BULLETIN, March 2001, at 23.
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right to their portion of the judgment.113 Similarly, the courts that followed the
joint-ownership theory held that the attorneys have a right to their share of the
income from the judgment. In the joint-ownership cases the courts held that
the attorney had the same right to the judgment as the client did because the
attorney was a joint owner of the taxpayer-client’s orchard.114
D. Capital Account Argument from Alexander v. IRS
The First Circuit case of Alexander dealt with the breach of an
employment contract, the breach of implied pension benefits and age
discrimination.115 The case was settled for $350,000 of which $250,000 was
allocated to the breach of contract and implied pension benefits claims and the
remaining $100,000 was allocated to the age discrimination claim.116 The
argument that the taxpayer-client unsuccessfully used to attempt to avoid
taxation of the attorney’s fees is interesting and worth mentioning.
The first step in the taxpayer-client’s argument was that the attorney’s fees
should be considered a cost of the disposition of one of taxpayer-clients assets
(or property).117 The asset the taxpayer-client has disposed of is their cause of
action. The taxpayer-client next contends that the attorney’s fees should be
charged to the capital account.118 Thus the basis of the property will be
adjusted to reflect the capital expenditure on the property.119 Finally, it is
stated that the “amount realized” for property is equal to the value of the
judgment and that amount will be offset by the basis in the property to
determine gain on the disposition of the property under IRC § 1001(a)120.121
The net effect of this is that the taxpayer-client should avoid taxation of the
attorney’s fees because the gain would be limited to the judgment award minus
the attorney’s fees.

113. Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125.
114. Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 857-58; Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 360.
115. 72 F.3d at 940.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 941.
118. The taxpayer contended that since IRC § 1001 and § 1016 do not make any distinction
between the basis and gain rules for capital or ordinary assets, there can be a capital account for
all assets whether they are ordinary or capital. Id. at 941-42. It is unclear how the taxpayer-client
was able to avoid the problem of the detailed examples of what a capital expenditure is in Reg. §
1.263(a)-1 and § 1.263(a)-2.
119. IRC § 1011(a) (1988) (“The adjusted basis for determining the gain or loss from the sale
or other disposition of property, whenever acquired, shall be the basis . . . as adjusted as provided
in section 1016”); IRC § 1016 (1988); 72 F.3d at 942. Since the property had no basis to begin
with, the entire basis of the property will be the capital expenditure of the attorney’s fees.
120. IRC § 1001(a) (2000).
121. The gain on dealings in property is included in gross income under IRC § 61(a)(3). IRC
§ 61(a)(3) (2000).
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The Alexander court did reject this argument, but gives no clear reason
why.122 The best possible reason is that legal fees do not fit within the
definition of capital expenditure set out in the Treasury Regulations123 and in
cases dealing with what expenditures are considered capital ones.124 The legal
fees do not fit into the definition primarily because they do not fit into any of
the examples given in the Treasury Regulations.125 This argument to not
include the contingent fees in the taxpayer-client’s gross income does not have
much merit because attorney’s fees do not fit into any definition or example of
capital expenditures.126 The only type of legal fees that are considered a
capital expenditure under the Treasury Regulations are those expended in
defending or perfecting title to property.127
E.

The Golsen Rule

When the Tax Court is faced with this issue and the appeal will go to the
Fifth, Sixth or Eleventh Circuits the Tax Court will most likely follow the
Golsen Rule, which is set out in the Tax Court case of Golsen v.
Commissioner.128 Simply put the Golsen Rule binds the Tax Court to follow
the opinions of the Court of Appeals, to which their opinion can be
appealed.129 As a result of the Golsen Rule the Tax Court in these circuits, the
Fifth, Sixth and Eleventh, will hold that the attorney fees paid under the
contingent fee agreement are not included in the taxpayer-client’s gross
income.
The Golsen Rule is narrow in the sense that it only applies to the Court of
Appeals to which the case can be appealed and none other.130 The reasoning
given for this rule is that it helps to promote more “efficient and harmonious

122. 72 F.3d at 942.
123. See Reg. § 1.263(a)-1; Reg. § 1.263(a)-2. See also supra note 118 and accompanying
text.
124. See INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 88-90 (1992) (holding that if the
benefit from the expense will last beyond the current tax year then it is most likely a capital
expense); United States v. Wehrli, 400 F.2d 686, 689-90 (10th Cir. 1968) (if an expenditure is
apart of a general plan of rehabilitation, modernization, and improvement of property it must be a
capital expense). But cf. Midland Empire Packing, Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 635 (1950) (an
expense incurred to allow taxpayer to continue with a particular use of property and not prepare it
for a new use is a ordinary and necessary expense that is currently deductible and will not be a
capital expenditure).
125. See Reg. § 1.263(a)-1; Reg. § 1.263(a)-2.
126. Id.
127. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(c).
128. 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970), aff’d, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940
(1971). Although the Golsen Rule only applies to these circuits it is generally followed and
applied in other circuits.
129. Id. at 757.
130. Id.
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judicial administration.”131 Though the Golsen rule was set down by the Tax
Court and could be overruled by an appellate court, it most likely will not be
because the Golsen Rule has become an important part of the appeals process
for tax cases.132
IV. CASES HOLDING THAT CONTINGENT FEES ARE INCLUDED IN THE CLIENT’S
GROSS INCOME
There are currently three circuits that include fees paid to attorneys under a
contingent fee arrangement in the taxpayer-client’s gross income. They are the
Federal,133 First134 and Ninth135 circuits. The Tax Court also follows the view
that the attorney’s fees should be included in the taxpayer-client’s gross
income.136 In all but one of these cases137 the IRS has taken the position that
the legal fees are included in the taxpayer-client’s gross income and that the
legal fees were miscellaneous itemized deductions subject to the two-percent
adjusted gross income limitation of miscellaneous deductions138 and the overall
limitation on itemized deductions.139 Finally, the IRS considers the attorney
fees to be subject to the Alternative Minimum Tax.140 The IRS has also
proposed that the attorney’s fees be included in the taxpayer-client’s gross
income because they made a taxable disposition of property.141
While they ruled in favor of the IRS’ position, the courts relied upon
different arguments to support their holdings. Though they used a variety of
131. Id.
132. See MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN & ALAN W. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ¶
7.06[3][d] (2001).
133. Baylin, 43 F.3d 1451.
134. Alexander, 72 F.3d 938.
135. Coady, 213 F.3d 1187; Benci-Woodward, 219 F.3d 941.
136. Kenseth v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. at 405-06 (2000) (provides a summary of the IRS’s
position). See cases cited supra note 106. But see also text supra Part III(E) (noting a limitation
on the IRS’s position).
137. See Baylin, 43 F.3d at 1453 (the IRS classified the legal fees as a capital expenditure).
138. IRC § 67 (2000). A miscellaneous itemized deduction is only allowed to the extent that
it exceeds 2% of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income.
139. IRC § 68 (2000).
140. IRC § 55 (2000); IRC § 56(b) (2000).
The Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) was originally set-up to tax income that was not
originally being taxed because of tax shelter investments. Over the years, the AMT has begun to
affect the average taxpayer, as shown by these contingent fee cases, because the AMT deals with
personal exemptions, standard deductions, state and local tax deductions, medical expense
deductions and miscellaneous itemized deductions. Since the IRS is classifying the attorney’s
fees as miscellaneous itemized deductions they are subject to the AMT. See IRC § 67(b) (2000)
(provides definition of “miscellaneous itemized deductions”); Robert P. Harvey & Jerry
Tempalski, The Individual AMT: Why It Matters, 50 NAT. TAX J. 453 (1997) (explaining how the
AMT works currently and what impacts it will be having in the future).
141. Davis, 210 F.3d at 1347-48.
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arguments, most courts began with the proposition set out in IRC § 61(a) that
defines gross income as “all income from whatever source derived.”142 The
most widely used support for inclusion of the fees was the assignment of
income doctrine from Earl143 and Horst.144 Many courts, though relying
primarily on the assignment of income doctrine, have also used another
method in conjunction with the assignment of income doctrine to support their
holdings. This other method is the “in lieu of” test from Raytheon.145
A.

Assignment of Income Doctrine

The assignment of income doctrine originated in Earl146 as an extension of
sections in the Revenue Acts of 1918147 and 1921.148 These acts state that a tax
is imposed upon all wages, salaries or compensation.149 The Court in Earl held
that the taxpayer who earned wages, salaries or compensation is the one who
must pay taxes upon it.150 In the well quoted passage from Earl the Supreme
Court states,
“[t]here is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned them
and provide that the tax could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and
contracts however skilfully [sic] devised to prevent the salary when paid from
vesting even for a second in the man who earned it.”151

The Supreme Court in Horst, which explained further the assignment of
income doctrine set out in Earl, dealt with the issue of whether there can be a
realization event of income by receiving the economic benefit of the income
without actually receiving the income in hand.152 The Supreme Court
acknowledged that income does not need to be received in hand to be credited
to the taxpayer’s gross income153 and that the primary purpose of the tax laws
is to tax the income of those who earn it or create the right to receive it.154 The
142. IRC § 61(a) (2000). See, e.g., Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 43031 (1955); James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 219 (1961). See Coady, 213 F.3d at 1190;
Alexander, 72 F.3d at 942; Baylin, 43 F.3d at 1454; Hukkanen-Campbell, 79 T.C.M. at 2124.
143. 281 U.S. at 114.
144. 311 U.S. 112.
145. 144 F.2d 110, 113 (1st Cir. 1944).
146. 281 U.S. at 114.
147. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1065 (1919) (“the term ‘gross income’ –
Includes . . . income derived from salaries, wages or compensation for personal service).
148. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 237 (1921) (“the term ‘ gross income’ –
Includes . . . income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service).
149. Id.
150. Earl, 281 U.S. at 114-15.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 114-15.
153. Id. at 115. See Old Colony Trust Co., 279 U.S. at 729 (holding that at discharge by a
third person of a debt owed by the taxpayer was equivalent to the taxpayer receiving the income).
154. Horst, 311 U.S. at 119.
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Supreme Court, in Horst, finally concluded that if the taxpayer has created a
right to receive income (i.e. earned it) and then assigns the income to a third
person, but in doing so receives the economic benefit of the income, it is as if
the taxpayer has received the income and thus will be taxed on that income.155
Before the Courts of Appeals could apply the assignment of income
doctrine to contingent fee agreements they must discover what economic
benefit that the taxpayer-client has received. The courts that have applied this
doctrine determined the economic benefit received was the attorney’s work
and effort in getting the judgment award for the taxpayer-client.156 Once the
courts found that the taxpayer-client received an economic benefit they could
hold that based on the assignment of income doctrine a realization event
occurred for the taxpayer.157 The amount of income that the taxpayer-client
realizes in this transaction is the amount of fees the attorney receives under the
contingent fee agreement.158
B.

“In Lieu of” Test

The “in lieu of” test is no so much a test applied to the fees paid to the
attorney as it is a test to determine in the first instance if the entire award
should be included in the gross income of the taxpayer-client.159 If the courts
find that the award should not be included in the gross income of the taxpayerclient, then the question of including the legal fee in their income is most likely
moot.160 But, if the courts find that the award should be included in the gross
155. Id. at 116-17 (“The taxpayer has equally enjoyed the fruits of his labor or investment and
obtained the satisfaction of his desires whether he collects and uses the income to procure those
satisfactions, or whether he disposes of his right to collect as the means of procuring them.”).
156. Baylin, 43 F.3d at 1454 (“the [taxpayer-client] received the benefit of those funds [the
award] in that the funds served to discharge the obligation of the [taxpayer-client] owing to the
attorney as a result of the attorney’s efforts to increase the settlement amount.”); Coady, 213 F.3d
at 1189-91 (same).
157. See Baylin, 43 F.3d at 1454; Coady, 213 F.3d at 1189-90.
158. The transaction referred to consists of the taxpayer-client receiving services from the
attorney and then paying them with money the taxpayer-client receives from the judgment.
Before final judgment in the case the value of the attorney’s fees are unknown. See infra Part
IV(C).
159. An example of the application of the “in lieu of” test would be a person receiving a
judgment against a former employer for back wages. In this case the judgment is being paid “in
lieu of” wages. Under IRC § 61 wages are included in gross income. The “in lieu of” test helps
to assure that a person does not avoid paying taxes on money that would be gross income had it
not been received by means of a court judgment.
160. If the “in lieu of” test indicates that the award should not be included in the taxpayerclient’s gross income, it could still be argued that the contingent fees paid to the attorneys should
be included in the taxpayer-client’s gross income. The basis for this argument would be claiming
that the taxpayer-client sold a portion of the claim to the attorney when entering into the
contingent fee agreement and had a gain on the sale of the claim in the amount of the attorney fee.
The effect of this argument would be to turn the whole judgment into a taxable event; the
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income of the taxpayer-client then the issue of whether or not to include the
attorney’s fees must be addressed.
The origin of the “in lieu of” test is the First Circuit Court of Appeals case
of Raytheon Production Corp. v. Commissioner.161 The court in this case was
faced with determining when lawsuit awards should be included in the gross
income of the party receiving the award.162 The test the court developed
simply asks the question of if the damages awarded are “in lieu of” some
payment that would normally be taxable.163 If the damages were awarded to
replace taxable items of income, such as lost wages or other items listed in IRC
§ 61164 then the recovery is taxable.165 However, if the damage award
compensates the taxpayer for non-taxable items, such as pain and suffering and
bodily injury, that portion of the award will be excluded from the taxpayerclient’s gross income.166
The courts have utilized the “in lieu of” test to include the portion of the
judgment paid to the taxpayer-client in his or her gross income, but the courts
have utilized the assignment of income doctrine167 (discussed above) to include
the portion of the judgment paid to the attorneys in the taxpayer-client’s gross
income. The utilization of these two doctrines allowed the courts to achieve
the goal of including the entire judgment in the taxpayer-client’s gross income.
C. Taxable Disposition of Property
In Davis v. Commissioner,168 the court rejected the IRS’ taxable
dispossession of property argument in favor of following Cotnam.169 The
IRS’s argument was that the taxpayer-client’s original cause of action can be
characterized as a type of personal property owned by the taxpayer-client, that
the contingent fee agreement is a dispossession of a portion of this property to
the attorney, and thus this transaction is a taxable event.170 The difficulty with
contingent fee portion of the judgment would be the taxpayer-client’s gain on the sale of the
claim to the attorney and the remainder of the judgment would be income to the taxpayer-client.
See Davis, 210 F.3d at 1347-48; see also infra Part IV(C).
161. 114 F.2d 110, 113 (1st Cir. 1944).
162. Id. at 111.
163. Id. at 113.
164. IRC § 61(a) (1994) (other sources of income can include rents, royalties, dividends,
alimony, life insurance payments, pensions, discharge from indebtedness, income from a
partnership and gains from dealings in property).
165. Raytheon, 114 F.2d at 113.
166. Id. See IRC § 104(a) (1994) (providing that certain types of compensation for injuries or
sickness are not included in the taxpayer’s gross income).
167. Coady 213 F.3d at 1190-91; Baylin, 43 F.3d at 1454.
168. 210 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2000).
169. See infra note 74. The Eleventh Circuit is bound to follow the precedent of the Fifth
Circuit.
170. Davis, 210 F.3d at 1347-48.
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this argument is that the cause of action did not have a definite value171 when
the contingent fee agreement was signed and thus has no basis.172 The IRS
proposes the solution to this problem is that the open transaction doctrine from
Burnet v. Logan173 be applied.174
The open transaction doctrine states that when a transaction occurs and the
value of the goods or services exchanged cannot be discerned then taxes are
not assessed until the values become certain.175 In these cases the value of the
attorney’s fees are uncertain until the judgment is given; at that point, however,
the value of the attorney’s fees becomes apparent and the taxpayer-client
should be taxed on the gain received for the sale of the cause of action.176 The
court in Davis rejected this argument on the grounds that the IRS did not fulfill
its burden of proving that neither the cause of action nor the attorney’s fees had
an undiscoverable value when the contingent fee agreement was signed.177 As
a result of holding that the open transaction doctrine did not apply the court did
not need to address whether there was a taxable disposition of property when
the contingent fee agreement was signed.178 The court in Davis does not
outright reject the IRS’s argument and thus in a later case if the IRS could
prove that the cause of action and the attorney’s fees do not have a
discoverable value when the contingent fee was entered into then this argument
might be found persuasive.
E.

Final Notes

The use of the “in lieu of” test is of assistance in showing that the portion
of the judgment paid to the taxpayer-client should be included in his or her
gross income, but the assignment of income doctrine has been used to reach
the result that the portion of the judgment paid to the attorneys is included in
the taxpayer-client’s gross income.179 It appears clear that the assignment of
income doctrine is the most effective argument to hold that the attorney’s fees
are included in the taxpayer-client’s gross income. The combination of these
two doctrines helps to keep the taxpayer-client from avoiding taxes by

171. IRC § 1001 (2000). In order to have income from the dispossession of property the
property must have a basis that is capable of being determined. Property may have a basis of
zero.
172. Davis, 210 F.3d at 1347-48.
173. 283 U.S. 404 (1931).
174. Davis, 210 F.3d at 1348.
175. Burnet, 283 U.S. at 412-13.
176. Davis, 210 F.3d at 1348.
177. Proving that the value of the cause of action and the attorney’s fees are undiscoverable is
a threshold issue that must be met before the open transaction doctrine can be applied. Id.
178. Id. at 1348 n.5.
179. See supra Part IV(A & B)
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disposing of the income he or she receives through some creative scheme
before actually receiving it.
V. THE CORRECT ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUE
The analysis of this issue is difficult. There are capable arguments on each
side of the issue. The persuasive arguments on the side to include the
contingent fees in the taxpayer-client’s gross income are the assignment of
income doctrine from Earl180 and Horst181 in combination with the “in lieu of”
test from Raytheon.182 In contrast, on the side to exclude the fees from the
taxpayer-client’s gross income is the argument that the attorney and taxpayerclient are joint-owners in a single piece of property is persuasive along with
persuasive arguments as to why the assignment of income doctrine should not
apply.
Perhaps the best way to look at the current state of this issue is to
acknowledge that there is no clear test. Thus, each case must currently be
looked at on an individual basis to determine whether the fees should be
included in the taxpayer-client’s gross income. It is important to note that
although the same ultimate issue was being addressed in many of the cases,
each of them arose out of different circumstances. For example, in Srivastava
the original claim was for defamation and related claims.183 In contrast, in
Cotnam the original claim was for breach of contract. 184 In that case Ms.
Cotnam had already performed her part of the contract and was thus seeking
payment for her work.185 It is clear that had Ms. Cotnam been paid without
having to go through the lawsuit the whole amount would be included in her
gross income under IRC § 61(a)(1)186 as compensation for services. In spite of
how the money / payment would have been characterized absent the lawsuit,
the court still allowed for the exclusion of the attorney’s fees from Ms.
Cotnam’s gross income. The question still remains why did this happen?
It is clear, as previously shown above, that there are significant difficulties
and confusion with respect to the current way courts determine if contingent
fees should be included in a taxpayer-client’s gross income. The primary
problem with the current method is that the same income could be included in
the taxpayer’s gross income or excluded depending on how and when the
income is received, as shown by Ms. Cotnam’s situation above. The income
could always be included if it is paid to the taxpayer absent any judicial

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

281 U.S. at 114.
311 U.S. at 114.
144 F.2d at 113.
220 F.3d at 355.
263 F.2d at 121-23.
Id. at 120.
IRC § 61(a)(1) (2000).
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proceeding, but the same income might not be included in the taxpayer’s gross
income if it is received through a judicial means and part of it is used to pay a
contingent fee to an attorney. This problem is a result of the current confusion
in the law relating to the inclusion or exclusion of contingent fees.
The correct analysis of this issue takes arguments from both sides of the
issue and will follow a two-step analysis.187 The first step is to apply the
Raytheon “in lieu of” test to the entire judgment award.188 This will determine
if the award is being paid in place of money that would normally be included
in gross income. The second step will clarify that the assignment of income
doctrine does not apply to contingent fee arrangements.
This two-step analysis does not utilize a per se rule to include or exclude
contingent fees in the taxpayer-client’s gross income but rather a clear, well
proven test to determine whether or not to include the contingent fees in the
taxpayer-client’s gross income. Since the “in lieu of” test is being applied to
the entire judgment award then contingent fees will be included or excluded in
the taxpayer-client’s gross income depending on the outcome of the “in lieu
of” test.
As previously discussed, the Raytheon “in lieu of” test does not look at the
type of the litigation – whether it is a contract claim or a tort claim – but it does
classify the award received based on the nature and the basis of the claim
litigated.189 Simply, the test asks the question, “In lieu of what were the
damages awarded?”.190 The second aspect of the Raytheon analysis is to
determine if the damages are “in lieu of” something normally included in the
taxpayer-client’s gross income.191 This is normally a simple exercise of
examining the list of items included in gross income under IRC § 61(a)192 to
see if what the award is “in lieu of” is on this list. In some cases it might
require more research depending on the nature and basis of the claim.193
The second step in the two-step analysis addresses the assignment of
income doctrine and its inapplicability to these cases. The primary reason why
the doctrine does not apply is that the taxpayer-client has relinquished control
over a portion of the ultimate judgment award. The portion that the taxpayerclient has relinquished control over is that portion to be paid to the attorney

187. As noted earlier damages received in personal injury cases on account of personal
physical injuries or sickness are not taxable, as such this test will not be applicable to those
damages.
188. 144 F.2d at 113.
189. Id.; Alexander, 72 F.3d at 942.
190. Raytheon, 144 F.2d at 113.
191. Alexander, 72 F.3d at 942.
192. IRC § 61(a) (2000).
193. See Sager Glove Corp. v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 1173, 1180-82 (1961), aff’d, 311 F.2d
210, 212 (7th Cir. 1962) (decision over what the settlement funds were “in lieu of” in an antitrust
case).
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under the contingent fee agreement. To use the analogy given above, the
taxpayer-client has given up entire trees from the orchard and is not just giving
up the fruit from some of the trees.194 Since whole trees have been given-up
then the taxpayer-client no longer has any control over those trees. Under Earl
and Horst once total control has been relinquished over the income the
taxpayer cannot be taxed on it.195 In both Earl and Horst the taxpayers
retained control or dominion over the funds that they transferred. In Horst, the
Court specifically held that so long as the taxpayer has control over the income
the income is taxable to them.196 This divestiture of control is the reason why
the assignment of income doctrine should not apply to contingent fee cases.197
It is true that under this two-part analysis the same result might be
achieved in some cases if the assignment of income doctrine were applied.
The reason for this is that the assignment of income doctrine would include the
contingent fees in the taxpayer-client’s gross income.198 The problem is that if
the assignment of income doctrine were applied as a blanket rule it will cause
contingent fees to always be included in the taxpayer-client’s gross income,
but by applying this two-step analysis contingent fees are only included in the
taxpayer-client’s gross income when the judgment award is “in lieu of” income
that is normally included in gross income.
It is clear from the “rules” of the assignment of income doctrine that it
cannot apply. There are two basic requirements of the doctrine, both of which
must be met. (1) The taxpayer retains control over the income and (2) That the

194. See infra Part III(C)(1)
195. See Earl, 281 U.S. 114-15; Horst, 311 U.S. 119. The taxpayer-client has not given up
total control over the litigation because under the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct the
attorney must abide by the decisions and objectives of the client concerning the representation.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1983).
The court in Srivastava examined this line of analysis but did not rest its holding on it,
but instead followed Cotnam and held that contingent fees should be included in the taxpayerclient’s gross income. 220 F.3d at 355.
196. 311 U.S. at 119 (“We have held without deviation that where the donor retains control of
the trust property the income is taxable to him although paid to the donee.”). See also
Commissioner v. First Sec. Bank, 405 U.S. 394, 403 (1972) (the Court stating that in order to be
taxed for income you must have dominion or control over it).
197. It is true that the taxpayer-client still has some control over the money in contingent fee
case (i.e. they can always attempt to withdraw the suit or take other actions to affect the outcome
of the suit) but they have divested some control over the claim.
In Srivastava, the court stated that the amount of control given up by the taxpayer-client
in a contingent fee agreement is enough to put the court in a “quandary” but it is not clear if it is
enough to avoid the application of the assignment of income doctrine. 220 F.3d at 364 (“a
taxpayer who enters into a contingent fee contract divests some measure of control over a claim
but retains the rest, and how much control is sufficient to trigger taxation under the anticipatory
assignment of income doctrine is not easily answerable”). See infra Part III(A).
198. The “in lieu of” test includes the fees because it is applied to the entire judgment not just
the portion paid to the taxpayer-client or the attorney.
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taxpayer receives the economic benefit of the income.199 In contingent fee
cases the taxpayer-client does not meet the first requirement because, as noted
above, the taxpayer-client has given-up control over a portion of they claim by
means of the contingent fee agreement, this divestiture of control is enough to
avoid application of the doctrine. The taxpayer-client does fulfill the second
requirement because he or she receives the economic benefit of the attorney’s
work.200
For example, if this test were applied Ms. Cotnam’s situation. The
judgment Ms. Cotnam received was in payment of services rendered to Mr.
Hunter during his lifetime. Under IRC § 61(a)(1) money received in payment
for services is included in gross income. Thus, under the “in lieu of” test Ms.
Cotnam’s judgment award should be included in her gross income because it
was received “in lieu of” money normally included in gross income. As noted
above, the assignment of income doctrine will not apply because Ms. Cotnam
divested control over a portion of her claim when she entered in to the
contingent fee agreement.
One final issue to be addressed is that in Srivastava, the court states that
the income should be charged to the party that earned it.201 Thus, since the
taxpayer-client has never earned the money that is paid to the attorney, the
legal fees should not be included in the taxpayer-client’s gross income.202 The
proper response to this it that the tax system does not allow for a person to
avoid taxation on income because of “anticipatory arrangements and contracts
however skillfully devised.”203 Had the taxpayer-client not entered into the
contingent fee agreement with the attorney but rather was billed by the hour or
other method, he or she would have been taxed on the entire amount of the
award. This situation should be no different just because of the contingent fee
agreement.
VI. CONCLUSION
The question of what should happen next still requires some discussion.204
Should the Supreme Court grant certiorari and decide the issue, most likely
applying the above analysis? Should the IRS give up on this issue, cease
litigating it and allow the taxpayer-clients to not include contingent fee
attorney fees in their gross income?

199. See Horst, 311 U.S. at 117, 119; Earl, 281 U.S. at 114-15.
200. See Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 360-61; Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 858.
201. 220 F.3d at 361.
202. Id.
203. Earl, 281 U.S. at 114-15.
204. The issue of what will happen next is an important one, but it is outside the scope of this
article and could easily be the topic of a separate article.
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One of the common reasons that the Supreme Court grants certiorari is the
presence of a split among the circuits on an issue, such a split exists on this
question.205 In order for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari to a case, the
case needs to be one in which a clear rule can be set down. The problem with
many of these cases is that they all have different facts and backgrounds that
may make it difficult to find one that can be used to set down a clear rule.
Based on the number of recent cases on this issue it appears that the IRS is
not going to change its position or stop litigating this issue in the near future.
The risk of continuing with the litigation, however, is that the split among the
circuits will expand to include more circuits, creating the dilemma for the IRS
of having different portions of the country being governed by the same tax
laws but with radically different interpretations of those tax laws.206 An
additional problem will be that similarly situated taxpayers will receive
different treatment.207 On the other hand, if the IRS gives up they could
possibly be losing a considerable source of tax revenue.
There are two things that can be said with certainty about this issue. The
first is that contingent fee arrangements defy easy categorization. On one hand
they look like a scheme to avoid taxation on income; and on the other, they
represent a complete divestment of an income source.208 The second is that as
the amount of litigation increases this issue will become increasingly important
and the need for it to be addressed will also grow.209 Exclusions from income
are an act of legislative grace. In the case of contingent attorney fees it seems
the legislature did not provide enough grace to exclude contingent attorney
fees from gross income.
DOUGLAS G. HICKEL

205. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988) (granting certiorari to resolve a
circuit split); Bank of America Nat’l Trust & Savings Ass’n v. 303 North LaSalle St. Partnership,
526 U.S. 434, 443 (1999) (granting certiorari to resolve a circuit split).
206. This situation does not create any constitutional or legal problems; the only problem that
it does create is a problem of managing different rules and standards for the IRS.
207. This is an issue of fairness, two taxpayers can bring identical suits in different circuits
with the same outcomes, but the their tax bill will be drastically different because one circuit
includes contingent fees in the taxpayer’s gross income and the other circuit does not include
contingent fees in the taxpayer’s gross income.
208. 220 F.3d 360.
209. In the past year alone four circuits have handed down decisions on the issue and two
others have handed down opinions in the past five years. This number does not include the large
number of Tax Court decisions on the issue.
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